Phishing, as a means of pilfering private consumer information by deception, has become a major security concern for financial institutions and their customers. Gartner estimated losses in 2006 to phishing in the US were approximately USD$2.8 Billion. Little has been published on the forensic characteristics exhibited in phishing e-mail. We hypothesize that shared features of phishing e-mails can be used as the basis for grouping perpetrators using at least a common modus operandi, and at most, a level of criminal organization -i.e., we suggest that phishing activities are carried out by a small number of highly specialized phishing gangs, rather than a large number of random and unrelated individuals using similar techniques. Analysis of repeated phishing e-mails samples at a major Australian financial institution -using a criminal intelligence methodology -revealed that 6 groups, from a sample of 500,000 spam e-mails, could be uniquely classified by constructing simple decision rules based on observed feature sets, and that 3 groups were responsible for 86% of all incidents. These results suggest that -at least for the institution concerned -there appears to be a level of criminal organization in phishing attacks.
INTRODUCTION
The hacking scene has, with the rise of phishing, been transformed in recent years from a culture based largely on youthful exploration, to one focused on criminal profit (Stamp et al,2007) . APACS, the UK payments association, reported UK online banking fraud was GBP£33.5 million in 2006 (APACS, 2007) . In January 2006, the Bulgarian National Services to Combat Organized Crime (NSCOC) agency arrested an organized ring of eight individuals who allegedly operated an international "phishing" operation (Technology News Daily, 2006) . Considerable anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that other transnational organized crime groups are involved in phishing activities (Naraine, 2006) .
To date, there has been little research into the individuals and groups behind phishing, how they are organized, and what methods they use. To effectively combat organized (rather than petty) criminals, a greater understanding of the means, motives and opportunities is required. Of course, phishing may not be a major concern for organized crime, and even if there were specific criminal "signatures" that indicated a level of organization, these may simply reflect a common modus operandi, as much as the sharing of intelligence and coordination of activities.
The goal of this paper is to present a first attempt at a new criminal intelligence methodology that aims to answer the question of how organized phishing groups are, in terms of modus operandi and coordination of attacks. To this end, we have investigated phishing attacks at a major Australian financial institution for two time periods (July and October 2006) . The aim was not do a "breadth first" search of all targets of phishing, but to examine the characteristics of attacks against a specific target. The results presented below present a level of support for our hypothesis that there is a high level of organization in phishing attacks -at least for the institution concerned -but further will be needed to see if the results are generalizable to financial institutions as a group, and to other organizations at large.
The first data set used in this study comprised a subset of identified phishing e-mails from a monthly "spam collection" in excess of 500,000 messages in July 2006. 71 unique phishing incidents were then identified. By examining these incidents using the method described below, we attempted to determine the level of organization for each attack, by examining their timing, and the relationship between each other. The method was then repeated for the October 2006 sample.
RELATED WORK
The majority of existing research phishing has focused on areas such as studying user response to phishing e-mails (Dhamija et al, 2006 )( (Jagatic et al 2005) , tools to model phishing attacks (Jakobsson 2005) , and e-mail content filtering defense mechanisms against phishing activities such as the Barracuda Spam Firewall, Microsoft Phishing Filter and Symantec Brightmail Anti-Spam software. Abad (2005) studied the economy of phishing networks by analyzing e-mails and instant messages collected from key phishing-related chat rooms. However, his work did not look into the forensic information of those phishing e-mails.
In regard to the research in analyzing the content of phishing e-mails for detection and classification purposes, both Chandrasekaran et al. (2005) and Fette et al. (2000) have focused on determining whether an e-mail is a phishing attempt or not. Ramzan and Wừest (2007) have focused on the trends seen in phishing attacks throughout 2006. The closest work to this research is reported by James (2005) that 48 distinct phishing groups were identified by analyzing the nature of the phishing emails and the phishing websites.
The analysis framework, as it stands, relies primarily on characterizing and determining the frequency of certain features in the phishing e-mails using a type of authorship analysis, to determine forensic signatures.
METHODS
Casual observations to date have been that incidents seem to be able to be grouped due to a large number of common characteristics. One well publicized group known as the "RockPhish" (McMillan, 2005) is well known by responders because of their distinctive style of attack. Thus, to answer our research question regarding the level of organization of phishing attacks, we have sought to make use of these distinctive features in developing a criminal intelligence methodology for phishing, based on authorship analysis.
Research in the mining of e-mail content for authorship analysis has a carried a long history since the advent of e-mail in the 1990s (de Vel, 2005) . The application of authorship analysis is usually focused on collecting authorship characteristics to be used in the context of plagiarism detection. However, authorship analysis can also be applied to identify a set of characteristics that remain relatively constant and unique to a particular author -in this case, the hypothesized phishing gangs.
To minimize systematic error and bias in making general observations across a range of different target sites, we focused on understanding the phishing attacks occurring at a major Australian financial institution. Two sets of e-mail spam data, of which phishing forms a subset, were analyzed (from July and October 2006).
We initially applied the authorship analysis to the July data set, with the intention of testing the reliability from this sample to a later October sample. We were interested here in both the variation in techniques used as a function of time, and whether discrete groups could still be identified.
In developing the criminal intelligence methodology, we primarily followed James ' (2005) work by investigating the following key items for identification:
• Bulk-mailing tool identification and features.
• Mailing habits, including, but not limited to, their specific patterns and schedules • Types of systems used for sending the spam (e-mail origination host) • Types of systems used for hosting the phishing server • Layout of the hostile phishing server, including the use of HTML, JavaScript, PHP, and other scripts • Naming convention of the URL used for the phishing site • IP address of the phishing site • Assignment of phishing e-mail account names • Choice of words in the subject line • The time-zone of the originating e-mail Building on this approach for each incident, where the data was available, the following features were also examined:
• The e-mail source including text used, metadata and header information • The web pages and web hosts used including directory structure and files • Any other characteristics which may have identified a link between separate incidents Based on feature similarity, the incidents were assigned a group number for each identified characteristic for the July dataset. Consideration was given to other causes of similarity, such as coincidental use of shared "phishing kits" (which might be the phishing equivalent of a rootkit), and spam-generating tools that may have produced similar footprints. Sets of rules based on these characteristics were used to produce a set of Perl scripts to analyze the October dataset.
The data examined for each incident included the full e-mail header and body. The content and structure of the phishing site, WHOIS information for each IP and domain used, details of web server software, operating system and port banners for other services running, were then obtained. Gathering together all of the potentially relevant information -from common DNS registrants to spelling mistakes -allowed us to build up a highly detailed case file for each incident, which in turn provided a rich data source for unique classification of each incident by a hypothesized criminal group.
RESULTS
The results below are presented with an ethical preface, in that some details of the investigative methodology have been simplified or omitted for the purpose of not revealing the exact modus operandi of the perpetrators. The goal here is to prevent alerting of the groups concerned (who may then change their techniques), and also to prevent other groups from adopting these techniques. Thus, in some cases, representative results that could be used to group the incidents have been presented, rather than compromising ongoing criminal investigations.
Grouping of Phishing Gangs
A number of attributes including structural features, patterns of vocabulary usage, stylistic and substylistic features are common attributes being used in authorship analysis, were used to define groups in this study (de Vel et all, 2000) . In all instances, at least three otherwise unrelated elements being used in common across incidents were used to allocate an incident to a group.
The grouping exercise identified six groups comprising 69 of the 71 incidents. The 6 groups were designated Group 1 to 6, and for the purposes of illustration, some general descriptions of the criteria that were used to select the groups are given below:
• The presence of distinctive phrases (especially spelling errors) in the message text.
• The presence of HTML hyperlinks in the message text, with a URL matching a specific pattern.
• The DCC checksums of the message text (indicative of identical text).
• The presence of certain exact strings in header fields (such as "From", "X-Mailer", and "X-Priority").
• The matching of a specific pattern in header field values (such as the subject, message-ID, and various e-mail address fields).
• The structure of given header fields, where more than one element was available for use (such as "Received" and "To").
• The overall MIME structure of the message (such as "text/plain" and then "text/html" enclosed in "multipart/related"). Figure 1 shows the relative composition of each group, and indicates that two incident were unable to be grouped using our methodology. Significantly, 61 of the 71 incidents were attributed to just three groups 1, 3 and 4. Those three groups in percentage terms accounted for an astonishing 86% of all incidents. 
Values that Enabled Grouping
Sub-groups within the spam corpus were identified by selecting several distinctive features of the kind described in Section 3. In this section we describe some of those criteria in more detail, and our quantitative findings.
Structure of Phishing Site
The URL structure was one of the elements used to group the incidents. Initial grouping by e-mail header data was often confirmed in phishing site structure. It was initially thought that web elements of each attack may have been more useful in grouping. However, on reflection, many of the noncontent web site elements were dependant not on the phishing groups themselves, but the victims whose sites are compromised to host the phishing sites. We considered the possibility that phishing kits which consisted primarily of web content may be responsible for some similarities in URL structure and web content, but we would not expect to see similarities in e-mail values as well, as a result of using these kits. Based on the information available from the July corpus, we investigated the contents of 86 phishing sites such as: details of the phishing site's URL, host IP address, domain registrant, domain registrar, country, NINS, CIDR, operating system, Web server type, the Web content and Charset used, and so on. Table 1 summarizes some of the commonly used words found in the URLs of phishing sites. In this example, the legitimate URL of the target's website was victimbank.com. As expected, the word "victimbank" (56%) had a high occurrence. However, variations such as "victimbankib" (48%) and "victimbankib/index.htm" (42%) were also observed. The use of this particular pattern "victimbankib" suggests a common nomenclature originating from a specific group of phishers. To substantiate this claim, we examined other details such as IP address, OS, Web server type, etc. collocated with the "victimbankib" pattern, and found the following:
• A particular range of class C IP subnet addresses range were frequently being used (28%). The result from a whois-search shows the IP range was managed by a particular Regional Internet Registry (RIR) in Europe.
• There are also many IP addresses used were in the class A subnet range (34%). Figure 2 shows that the USA (47%) and Great Britain (19%) were the top two most popular countries hosting phishing sites for the July 2006 sample. This indicates that ISPs in the USA and the UK are either more prone to hosting phishing attacks due to insufficient defense against phishing activities, or due to the vast numbers of ISPs available in these two countries. Additionally, in some 11% of cases, multiple sites were used. We believe this indicates a trend towards the nextgeneration of botnet-style hosting for phishing sites, which have been growing seen since this sample was gathered.
Time of day is another possible fingerprint, When we examined Tuesday 18 July 2006 in detail (Table 8) , 12 phishing incidents were observed, starting at 4.01am and continuing to 8.59am, then followed by a break of about ten hours, followed again by three from 6.44pm to 7.39pm. This may be deliberate targeting of the victim users when they access their systems in the morning and first thing in the evening, or may again indicate the working schedule of the phishers themselves. (Table 8) , 12 phishing incidents were observed, starting at 4.01am and continuing to 8.59am, then followed by a break of about ten hours, followed again by three from 6.44pm to 7.39pm. This may be deliberate targeting of the victim users when they access their systems in the morning and first thing in the evening, or may again indicate the working schedule of the phishers themselves. In the October corpus, a new style of attacks were identified for a particular phishing group not seen in July. The group used a URL that spoofed "victimbank.com" and had a hostname component of "confirmationpage". They assigned each individual phishing URL a subdomain that was tied to an Internet address of a compromised computer under the phisher's control. When a victim clicked on a link in the phishing e-mail, they would be routed through the compromised PC to the correct phishing Web page, depending on a special code specified in the e-mail link. The methodology resembles that used by the "RockPhish" group mentioned earlier. Our analysis showed that while values such as IP address source were interesting, they did not prove to be useful for classifying groups. However, some less obvious features were unexpectedly more useful for grouping. Two particular values associated with a particular group, the X-Mailer and the Date field time zone were observed only in phishing e-mails and never in any valid e-mail in the sample data (which included more than 500,000 spam messages). Figure 5 shows that Microsoft Outlook Express version 5 and 6 were the most widely used X-Mailer platform in the July phishing incidents. This result was confirmed in the October corpus, as shown in Table 2 . One abnormality observed in the July corpus was the frequent occurrence of an invalid value (71%). 7,291 messages in the October corpus with this particular value and 3,680 of those messages targeting other victim organizations and were associated with other illegal activities, such as job scams.
E-mail Header Information
Thus, the X-Mailer value appeared to be the main fingerprint of the spam tool used by this particular group. Google searches using the X-Mailer values were subsequently used to identify other phishing messages posted to the web and newsgroups. As these values are still in use by phishing groups today, we are precluded from providing further details. Other e-mails values examined and used for grouping were the subject and sender values. While many phishing e-mails spoof the victim institution, some do use other e-mail addresses. As shown in Table 3 , when spoofing the organization's e-mail domain, there were many choices of username to spoof from the victim institution e.g.. support@victimbank.com, admin@victimbank.com, security@victimbank.com, or access@victimbank.com. While all these values are subject to copycatting, they can be used in conjunction with other more highly discriminating values to facilitate grouping. Table 4 shows the result of our analysis in the Subject line from the July corpus. A majority of the phishing e-mail subject lines used a Base-64 encoded character string (41%). This indicates a program-generated subject line. Another commonly used word is "update" (30%) as contained in the subject: "Security Update Request" and "Agreement Update". The third most commonly used word is "access" (21%), as contained in the subject: "Online Access Agreement Update". The other commonly chosen words were "Account" (18%), "victim-bank Internet banking security message" (15%). 220,494 distinct subject line values out of the total 770,998 e-mails were found in the October 2006 corpus. 43% of the total corpus contains a delivery failure notification in the subject line. The October 2006 corpus also confirmed that phishing Group 1 was active in launching the attack with 3,611 messages (0.5% of the corpus) were identified targeting this particular financial organization. Interestingly, by using the signatures left by Group 1 in their phishing messages, another 3,280 messages were identified targeting other financial organizations including CitiBank, PayPal and Bank of America. It is logical to expect that money mule job scams of a kind have been perpetrated in conjunction with phishing attacks, again indicating a high level of organization through diversified criminal activity. This was confirmed with another 488 messages that started with "Job offer" in the message subject (Table 5) . Moreover, we have also identified 238 'Nigerian 419 scam' messages having the same signatures that belong to Group 1. These results indicate that phishing attacks are related to other crimes committed using e-mail. We also found 6,523 (0.9%) messages contained the subject line: "victim Bank official message". This matched one of the key characteristics of the Group 6 phishers, although the subject lines found in the October corpus differed slightly with those found in the July corpus. Further investigation confirmed that these emails were originated from the same group. Other characteristics that confirm our grouping for this particular Group 6 are:
E-mail Subject, Sender and other Text Values
• The e-mail structure is text/html;
• The DCC Fuz2 value for the e-mail content is equal to a particular value; • The From field contains the common plain text "victimbank security"; and • The Sender field contains a particular user value.
DCC Fuz2 Checksum
The Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse (DCC) is an anti-spam content filter (http://www.dccservers.net/dcc/) used by SMTP servers and mail user agents to detect spam messages. We applied DCC Fuz2 checksum on all messages in the October corpus and identified 560,801 distinct values. Some of the most frequent messages are listed in table 6. We found that both Group 1 and Group 2 phishing gangs were active in October 2006. Group 2 had launched separate attacks against this organization and another victim bank. 
Spelling and other Typographic Errors
Another interesting aspect of many phishing e-mails is their grammar and spelling. A standard feature of many early phishing e-mails were their very poor grammar and spelling. Common errors include "statment", "acount", "fullfil" and "automaticly". Many of these errors have now disappeared, but they are still a useful value to identify groups. In addition to clear spelling, grammatical errors and other typographic errors, unusual terminology is another useful grouping value. An example of this is a reference found in one group's e-mails to a fictional entity the "National Anti-fraud Organisation of Australia" (Group 4). We found that a specific typographical error occurred in many phishing messages e-mails that could not be identified by a spellchecker. This is a strong indicator for the grouping of phishing messages to a particular group. Using that particular word to search in Google found that this particular word appeared in e-mails related to other activities such as the Nigerian 419 Scam and the eBay (VOLUME 2 of 3 Share) scam. Table 7 shows that phishing incidents seemed to occur at the midweek dates (Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday), and the peak value occurred at a Tuesday (12 incidents). Most of the weekly peakincidents occurred on Thursdays. From Table 7 and Figure 6 we observed that some groups concentrated their attacks over shorter periods. For example, of Group 1's 30 attacks, 29 occurred over two weeks in a period of five days, followed by a period of four days in the following week. In contrast, Group 3's 13 attacks occurred over nearly the whole month on 11 different days. Another interesting aspect is the virtual weekend enjoyed by the phishers. While there are attacks on Saturdays and Sundays, there appears to be a break between weeks for most attacks because of the 11 incident free days for the month, they all fall in the Friday to Monday period. This indicates an organized work schedule, confirming the result obtained by Ramzan and Wừest (2007) . (Table 8) , 12 phishing incidents were observed, starting at 4.01am and continuing to 8.59am, then followed by a break of about ten hours, followed again by three from 6.44pm to 7.39pm. This may be deliberate targeting of the victim users when they access their systems in the morning and first thing in the evening, or may again indicate the working schedule of the phishers themselves. 
Phishing Incidents by Date and by Group

CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown how a criminal investigation methodology based on authorship analysis and fingerprinting can be used to classify phishing e-mails into a small number of discrete groups. While most spam e-mails do not aim to misrepresent their identity, this is the goal for phishing e-mails.
To summarize, some 6 distinct groups were responsible for the overwhelming majority of attacks identified in both sets of data. 86% of all attacks originated from of these groups. In many cases, the distinguishing features of phishing e-mails were found in other e-mail crimes such as money laundering and 419 scams. This indicates that phishing groups are diversified criminal enterprises, each using their own distinctive modus operandi to commit crimes across a wide spectrum. Other indicators of organized work activity included taking breaks at weekends, and launching attacking during daytime hours from the geographical source regions. On the technical side, the use of multiple servers to provide fail-over during attacks indicates a growing trend for a sophisticated distributed computing capability on the same level as legitimate organizations. As discussed in the introduction, only data from a single target in the financial services area was used to develop the investigation methodology. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that most banks and financial institutions are experiencing qualitatively similar attacks. Our first task in generalizing our findings will be to replicate the results across data sets from other institutions. Of course, practical difficulties exist in obtaining this data from organizations that keep their operational security issues secret.
A second major challenge is to validate the findings across further time periods, and get a sense of the variation in both group composition and features used. One can anticipate a high-level of turnover in the features used, however, if they are not revealed in the public arena and/or incorporated into anti-spam signature databases, then our experience is that the values are not altered.
We are also investigating methods that enable automated profiling of phishing attacks by groups in real time and be built in to commercial tools for law enforcement based on classification techniques from natural language processing (Watters,2002) . We intend to extend the approach by utilizing hierarchical clustering to identify more complex patterns of heredity among the different techniques being used by each group.
